Equity by King, Edgar I.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 3
1954
Equity
Edgar I. King
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Edgar I. King, Equity, 5 W. Res. L. Rev. 270 (1954)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol5/iss3/17
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
existed for holding the wife bound by the agreement, for it is also provided
by statute'5 that an action to set aside a separation agreement must be com-
menced within six months after the appointment of an executor or ad-
ministrator. This statute contains no saving clause which tolls its operation
in case of minority or other disability. It was admitted by stipulations of
fact that an action to set the agreement aside was not begun within this
period.
ROBERT C. BENSING
EQUITY
Of the few equity cases worthy of note during the past year most of them
concerned the specific performance of real property transactions.
In Jamtson v. Lindblom,' the plaintiff asked the court to specifically
enforce the following provision of a lease: "That at the expiration of the
within lease the lessee herein shall have the right of refusal of a new lease
of said premises for a price to be agreed upon by the parties." The court
recognized the holdings of earlier cases that when a lease provides for a
renewal at a price to be agreed upon between the parties, the court will upon
failure of one of the parties to agree fix the renewal rental. However, the
court refused to apply this approach in the present case, holding instead
that where a "new lease" was called for, as here, such covenant " con-
templates and implies only that a new lease shall be given only for such time
and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon at the time
by the parties."'  Consequently, specific performance was denied. The
court is, of course, bound by the terms of the instrument and is probably cor-
rect in its construction of the clause involved. However, from the view-
point of a draftsman it can be asked whether the parties by the use of the
above clause intended a legal consequence so different from that which
would have resulted from the use of the more conventional renewal clause.
In Alexander v. Greenfield,3 the court considered a request by the pur-
chaser for specific performance of a land contract. The vendor, after giving
an option to this purchaser, had conveyed the land to a mentally incompe-
tent person. Subsequently the option was exercised. There were other
complicating facts, but on this point the court held that the mentally in-
competent person was capable of receiving title to real property. But being
mentally incompetent such person was incapable of making a valid deed
so that the subsequent act of the vendor in causing the incompetent to re-
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